Introduction
Prior research on institutional investors focuses on their role in affecting investment decisions and stock prices. However, more recent research has begun to examine the role of institutions in corporate governance. Do institutional investors serve as external monitors to managers, or do they put excessive pressure on managers? How does the presence of institutional investors with different investment horizons affect managers' behavior? This paper attempts to shed light on these questions in the context of tax reporting. Specifically, this paper examines whether investment horizons of institutions affect firms' tax aggressiveness behavior.
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Two theoretical views motivate our inquiry. Under the traditional view, tax aggressiveness represents a value maximizing activity for a firm because it entails a transfer of wealth from the government to a firm's shareholders. Thus, shareholder value should increase with corporate tax avoidance activity so long as the expected marginal benefit exceeds marginal cost (Desai and Dharmapala 2009b) . 2 Frank et al. (2007) show that the stock market rewards (rather than penalizes) firms with tax aggressive practices, consistent with the notion that these firms engage in value-maximizing behavior.
In contrast, a second view emphasizes the role of agency costs arising from the separation of ownership and control in influencing tax aggressiveness in publicly-held firms. Theoretical models highlight how tax avoidance activities can create a shield for managerial opportunism 1 Consistent with Chen et al. (2009) , we define tax aggressiveness as the downward management of taxable income or a reduction in the payment of taxes after conducting tax planning activities. The tax planning activities may be legal, illegal or in the "grey area. " Frank et al. (2009) provide several examples of tax aggressive activities which include transfer pricing arrangements, location of intangible property in low-tax location, utilization of flow-through entities in structured transactions, synthetic lease arrangements, and tax shelter transactions.
and diversion of rents. For example, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) show analytically how highpowered managerial incentives influence tax sheltering. Empirically, they find increases in incentive compensation reduce the level of tax sheltering primarily for firms with relatively weak governance arrangements. In a related paper, Desai and Dharampala (2009a) find that corporate tax aggressiveness is positively related to firm value and that investors doubt the value of such activities for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership.
Given that there need not be a one-to-one correspondence between tax aggressiveness and firm value, a priori, it is unclear what effect institutional investors exert on tax aggressiveness. Anecdotally, there is a tension among institutional investors on the actions they should take against a firm's use of abusive tax shelters, particularly in the form of offshore tax havens. A recent panel discussion hosted by the Conference Board in New York (Stock 2003 ) is illustrative of this point.
"You can't give a fiduciary a hard time for maximizing profits. I cannot prohibit managers from taking advantage of legal strategies that are to the benefit of my pensioners -that's my job." Richard Moore, North Carolina State Treasurer "We are concerned about the aggressive use of tax shelters that may cause companies to manipulate earnings to hide the health of the company. Shareholders are interested in long-term growth not short-term accounting gimmicks," Rich Ferlauto, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Director of Pension Investment Policy Theoretical work by Kahn and Winton (1998) , Maug (1998) and Shliefer and Vishny (1986) model how institutions face a cost-benefit analysis of monitoring for shared gains versus trading for private gains. This line of research highlights the role of the investment horizons of institutions in affecting the degree to which firm managers are monitored.
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Empirical evidence 3 Under this framework, monitoring occurs in the form of long-term and short-term information gathered and the efforts to influence management (Chen et al. 2007 ).
supports the notion that while institutions are well-informed, some institutions are too focused on short-term earnings. Bushee (2001) finds that transient institutional investors (i.e., institutions that trade actively to maximize short-term profits) not only exhibit strong preferences for nearterm earnings, but these preferences also translate into realization of short-term trading gains. Gasper et al. (2005) argue that this short-term focus stems from the fact that institutions with a shorter investment horizon have fewer incentives to spend resources in monitoring because the length of their investment horizon may not allow them to reap the corresponding benefits. In contrast, Chen et al. (2007) argue that investors with a longer investment horizon not only have lower monitoring cost functions but also have more influence on management because of better information and ability to process that information.
In our context, to the extent that institutions with short-term horizon have less of an incentive to monitor managers, they may influence firms to be more tax aggressive in an effort to maximize after-tax earnings and after-tax cash flows. This is based on the belief that that stock market may reward firms with tax aggressive practices, and that these institutions will sell their stakes before the stock market penalizes firms. Thus, institutional investors with short-term horizon may encourage managers to be more tax aggressive. In contrast, if tax avoidance activities enable rent extraction by managers, then institutions with long-term horizon are more likely to engage in monitoring and influencing the management in avoiding tax aggressiveness. Thus, our hypotheses predict that we should observe more tax aggressiveness for firms held by short-term investors and less tax aggressiveness by firms held by long-term investors.
To test the relation between tax aggressiveness and investment horizon of shareholders, we use two different proxies to measure tax aggressiveness at the firm-level. 5 Our first proxy is the five-year cash effective tax rate as proposed by Dyreng et al. (2008 Our sample covers 19,029 firm-year observations over the 1995-2008 time period. Our results indicate that firms with higher levels of short-term institutional ownership generally display higher levels of tax aggressiveness by reporting lower five-year cash effective tax rates and higher permanent book-tax differences. In contrast, firms with higher levels of long-term institutional ownership are generally less tax aggressive. These results hold even after controlling for profitability, debt tax shields, non-debt tax shields, income statement items known to cause book-tax differences unrelated to aggressiveness, size and growth potential.
5 For a review of measures of tax aggressiveness used in the literature, see Hanlon and Heitzman (2009). Our estimates predict that a difference in cash effective tax rate between the 75 th and the 25 th percentile short-term institutional ownership will be 2.3% lower. In contrast, a difference in cash effective tax rate between the 75 th and the 25 th percentile long-term institutional ownership will be 3.62% higher. For comparison, the average five-year cash effective tax rate in our sample is 28%. Therefore, the differential rates of 2.30% and 3.62% for short-term and longterm institutional ownership, respectively, represent a large change.
Our results are generally robust to using different estimation techniques, including instrumental variables. Although it is impossible to rule out all alternative explanations, we also conduct a change analysis as opposed to a level analysis. We find that as short-term institutional ownership increases from the prior year, firms' exhibit increased tax aggressiveness through higher permanent book-tax differences as compared to the prior year. In contrast, as long-term institutional ownership increases relative to the prior year, firms become less tax aggressive and report relatively lower amounts of permanent book-tax differences. The results of the intertemporal change analysis provide greater confidence in interpreting the results.
We further explore whether the effect of the investment horizons of institutions on tax aggressiveness varies across firms with different levels of cash holdings. Desai and Dharampala (2006) argue that tax avoidance activities can result in more expropriation of investors' wealth by self-serving managers who can easily divert firm resources without detection. This is particularly problematic for cash holdings because it is a fungible asset. We find firms with more long-term investors display less tax aggressiveness in the form of permanent book-tax differences when the level of cash is high than when the level of cash is low. In contrast, we find firms with more short-term institutions exhibit more tax aggressiveness in the form of permanent book-tax differences in firms with higher cash.
Overall, our findings contribute to two streams of literature. First, we contribute to the literature that has begun to examine the effects of ownership structures on tax aggressiveness.
For example, Badertscher et al. (2009) find that private firms are generally more tax aggressive than public firms and private firms that are majority-owned by private equity firms exhibit more tax aggressiveness than other privately-held companies. In contrast, Chen et al. (2009) find that family firms are generally less tax aggressive than non-family firms. However, prior research has not examined the influence of institutional ownership on the tax aggressiveness of firms. We attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining the impact of the investment horizons of institutions on tax aggressiveness. We find more tax aggressiveness for short-term intuitions and less tax aggressiveness for long-term institutions.
Second, we contribute to the literature that examines the role of institutional owners as part of the corporate governance mechanisms. For example, Bushee (1998) finds that more ownership by institutions that have high portfolio turnover significantly increases the probability that managers reduce research and development expenditures to reverse an earnings decline. In contrast, Chung et al. (2002) find that managers are deterred from fully pursuing opportunistic earnings management through discretionary accrual choices when institutions own a large percentage of shares outstanding. Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms with greater institutional ownership are more likely to issue a forecast and that these forecasts tend to be more specific, accurate, and less optimistically biased. Our results indicate that while short-term institutional investors encourage managers to be more tax aggressive, the long-term institutional investors can mitigate tax aggressiveness. Overall, our results underscore the importance of differentiating among institutions with short and long-term horizons.
Our paper is organized into the following sections. In section 2, we discuss the related literature and develop our three hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe our measure of a firm's tax aggressiveness and institutional ownership. Section 4 describes our data and empirical methodology. Section 5 contains a discussion of our empirical results. We conclude the paper in section 6.
Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
The incurrence and payment of income taxes is a substantial expense for firms on their income statement and a substantial line item for firms on their statement of cash flows.
Therefore, in an effort to increase not only after-tax earnings per share but also cash available for shareholders, firms may spend significant time, energy and money to reduce their tax burden through tax aggressiveness. Firms can demonstrate tax aggressiveness in a variety of ways which includes reducing their five-year cash effective tax rate or by increasing their permanent differences between financial accounting income reported to shareholders and their taxable income reported to the government. In theory, a dollar saved in taxes through an aggressive tax practice is an extra dollar for shareholders because tax aggressiveness leads to tax savings in the current period.
Still, tax aggressiveness may not increase firm value. For example, more tax aggressiveness not only can cost the firm in the long-term in terms of an increased probability of a tax audit leading to an assessment of additional taxes, fines, interest and penalties by the IRS but also can provide a shield for managerial opportunism (Mills 1998; Desai and Dharamapala 2008) . The argument here is that technologies of tax avoidance can reduce the costs of managerial diversion or the likelihood of detection (Desai and Dharamapala 2009b) . In other words, managers of tax aggressive firms may redirect tax savings for their own purposes. Desai and Dharamapala (2006) show that complex tax shelter transactions that are designed to obscure the economic substance of the transaction may also increase the opportunities for managerial diversion. Desai and Dharamapala (2009b) et al. (2007) find that firms with aggressive financial and tax reporting contemporaneously experience higher abnormal stock returns than firms with less aggressive financial and tax reporting, which suggests that the market recognizes and rewards firms with aggressive policies.
In contrast, Frank et al. (2009) find that the market overprices tax reporting aggressiveness only for those firms with the most aggressive financial reporting. Wilson (2009) finds that wellgoverned tax shelter firms experience significantly positive abnormal stock returns in the periods before, during, and after the tax shelter activity. In contrast, poorly-governed tax shelter firms experience significantly lower abnormal stock returns over the same time periods. Thus, there is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between tax aggressiveness and firm value, which suggests that the incentive to monitor managers may vary across institutional investors.
Prior research also suggests that some institutional shareholders have an excessive focus on short-term performance that leads corporate managers to make decisions to boost short-term earnings (Laverty 1996) . For example, Bushee (1998) In contrast, some institutional investors may effectively monitor and discipline managers to ensure that they maximize long-term value (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . Monks and Minow (1995) argue that investors with long-term horizon have strong incentives to monitor management to ensure that it is acting in the best interest of the firm. Given that there is a complementary relation between rent extraction and tax avoidance (Desai and Dharampala 2006) , long-term investors may engage in even more monitoring. Moreover, Porter (1992) argues that long-term investors have better access to private information about their portfolio firms. Supporting this view, Bushee (1998) finds that large stockholdings of institutional shareholders prevent managers from reducing research and development expenditures in quarters when the firm fails to meet short-term earnings goals. Chen et al. (2007) find that the presence of large holdings by independent long-term institutions results in better post-merger performance. In addition, Del Guercio (1996) notes that several types of institutional shareholders have prudent shareholder standards that may influence firms to be less tax aggressive to avoid future costs of higher tax penalties. Thus, institutions with long-term horizon are more likely to constrain managers' tax aggressiveness.
Thus, our two hypotheses are stated as follows.
Hypothesis 1: Firms are likely to be more tax aggressive as the fraction of its shares held by short-term institutions increases, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 2: Firms are likely to be less tax aggressive as the fraction of its shares held by longterm institutions increases, ceteris paribus.
Measurement of Tax Aggressiveness and Institutional Ownership
The focus of this study is on examining the relation between tax aggressiveness and the investment horizon of institutional ownership. We explain each of these measures in detail next.
Tax Aggressiveness Measures
Early research on tax aggressiveness relied on inferring the level of a firm's tax aggressiveness from its effective tax rate (ETR), calculated as total tax expense divided by pretax book income. However subsequent research by (Hanlon 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008 ) identified a number of limitations of using ETRs as a measure of tax aggressiveness. While there are several measures of tax aggressiveness in the literature, we chose two different measures of tax aggressiveness for our study. 6 Our first measure of tax aggressiveness is the firm's five-year 6 For the pros and cons of the proxies used in the literature to measure tax aggressiveness, see Hanlon and Heitzman (2009). average cash effective tax rate as measured by Dyreng et al. (2008) . where the firm's five-year cash effective tax rate is equal to the sum of the taxes paid in cash (Compustat # 317) by the firm over the previous five years divided by the sum of a firm's pretax income (Compustat # 170) less special items (Compustat # 17) over the previous five years. We infer that firms with lower (higher) five-year cash effective tax rates are relatively more (less) tax aggressive.
Our second measure of tax aggressiveness, based on the work of Rego and Wilson (2008) , measures the amount of permanent book-tax differences (PERM_BTD) reported by the firm for the current year and is calculated as follows:
Specifically, a permanent book-tax difference is calculated as the firm's pre-tax book income (BI) (Compustat #170) less an estimate of taxable income grossed-up by the statutory corporate tax rate and deferred tax expense grossed-up by the statutory corporate tax rate. We estimate taxable income by adding current federal tax expense (CFTE) (Compustat #63) and current foreign tax expense (CFOR) (Compustat #64) and then dividing that sum by the highest marginal U.S. Corporate statutory tax rate (STR).
8
Next we subtract deferred tax expenses (DTE) 7 Dyreng et al. (2008) calculated cash effective tax rates over both a five-year and ten-year period.
(Compustat #50) grossed-up by the highest marginal U.S. corporate statutory tax rate (STR). 9 We then scale our measure of permanent book-tax differences by beginning total assets (Assets).
Firms with higher (lower) yearly levels of permanent book-tax differences are considered to be more (less) tax aggressive. Prior research (Rego and Wilson 2008; Weisbach 2002; Shevlin 2002) suggests that that the ideal tax shelter or tax aggressive investments create a permanent rather than a temporary book-tax difference.
10 As a result, a measure of permanent book-tax differences may be a better proxy for tax aggressiveness than a measure of overall book-tax differences. 
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Measures of Institutional Shareholders and Investment Horizon
Where S k,i,t and S k,i,t-1 are the number of shares held by the institutional shareholders k in stock i at the end of quarter t and at the end of quarter t-1, respectively. P i,t and P i,t-1 is the price of each share of stock i at the end of quarter t and at the end of quarter t-1, respectively. Following prior research, we adjust for stock splits and stock dividends by using the CRSP price adjustment factor. To calculate the churn rate (CR) for each k institution for quarter i, we follow Yan and Zhang (2009) and use the following equation:
In less 1% of our sample, firms reported institutional ownership in excess of 100%
We then calculate the average churn rate for each institution for each calendar year.
Institutions with comparatively larger churn rates are institutional shareholders with short-term investment horizons that typically buy and sell a significant portion of their investment portfolio each year. After finding the churn rate for each institution for each year, we compute the median churn rate for all institutional shareholders. Institutions that report a yearly churn rate of less (more) than the median churn rate for all institutional shareholders are classified as long-term (short-term) institutional shareholders. We then calculate the percentage of each firm's shares owned by long-term and short-term institutional shareholders and code them as LTInstOwn and STInstOwn, respectively.
Sample and Research Design
Sample
Our initial sample consists of 53,736 non-financial institution and non-utility firm-year observations in Compustat between 1995 and 2008 with available institutional ownership information. 13 We eliminated all financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) because prior research suggests that regulated firms are subject to a different set of tax and/or book rules. (Hanlon et al. 2005 = Natural logarithm of market value of equity (#199 * #25) for firm i, at the beginning of year t Market/Book i,t-1 = Market to book ratio for firm i, at the beginning of year t, measured as market value of equity (#199 * #25), scaled by book value of equity (#60) Based on our first hypothesis, firms with higher levels of short-term institutional ownership should exhibit more tax aggressiveness in the form of lower five-year cash effective tax rates and higher yearly permanent book-tax differences. Thus, we expect the coefficient on STInstOwn, β 2 , to be negative when the dependent variable is the 5-year cash effective tax rate.
However, when the dependent variable is permanent book-tax differences (PERM_BTD), we expect β 2 to be positive.
In terms of our second hypothesis, firms with higher levels of long-term institutional ownership should exhibit less tax aggressiveness in the form of higher five-year cash effective tax rates and lower yearly permanent book-tax differences. Thus, we expect the coefficient on LTInstOwn, β 1 , to be positive when the dependent variable is the 5-year cash effective tax rate, and it should be negative when the dependent variable is permanent book-tax differences (PERM_BTD).
Control Variables
In equation (1), we control for year-fixed effects, industry-fixed effects, and several firm characteristics that the prior literature (e.g., Manzon and Plesko 2002; Rego 2003; Mills 1998; Dyreng et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2009 ) has shown to be correlated with tax aggressiveness. Our first set of control variables, (ROE, Leverage, NOL_Dum, ChangeNOL, Foreign Income and Equity Income) are used to control for the firm's profitability, leverage, foreign operations, and income from subsidiaries Prior research suggests that more profitable firms have higher cash effective tax rates as well as higher levels of book-tax differences. In contrast, prior literature suggests that firms with higher debt tax shields generally have smaller book-tax differences. Moreover, we control for net operating losses, changes in net operating losses, foreign income, and equity income because these items give rise to book-tax differences that may not necessarily reflect aggressive tax policies by the firm.
Our second group of control variables (PPE, Intangible Assets) control for differences in book tax reporting that can affect tax aggressiveness. 16 Firms with higher levels of either fixed or intangible assets tend to have higher non-debt tax shields in the form of higher depreciation or amortization deductions for tax purposes than those depicted in the books. Hence, we control for a firm's property plant and equipment scaled by total assets and a firm's intangible assets scaled by firm total assets in our regression model.
We also control for firm size and growth opportunities. Prior literature suggests that larger firms exhibit more book-tax differences and that high growth firms have more investments that generate book-tax differences. We use natural log of market value of equity as a proxy for firm size and market-to-book ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities.
Research Design -OLS Regression (change analysis regression)
Our hypotheses predict that a firm's level of tax aggressiveness is associated with the percentage of outstanding stock owned by short-term and long-term institutional shareholders.
However, we recognize that it may be important to consider the endogenous nature of ownership when examining firms' tax aggressiveness behavior. For example, institutions may not only have incentives to affect tax aggressiveness by firms in which they choose to invest, but also prefer to buy stocks in firms that exhibit certain levels of tax aggressiveness. Therefore, a failure to incorporate this endogeneity into our research design could result in misleading inferences.
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For this reason, we conduct two additional tests. As a first additional test, we regress yearly changes in tax aggressiveness on yearly changes in short-term institutional ownership, yearly changes in long-term institutional ownership and changes in control variables.
Specifically, we implement the following regression equation:
ΔTaxAgg i,t = α 0 + β 1 ΔLTInstOwn i,t + β 2 ΔSTInstOwn i,t + β 3 ΔROE i,t + β 4 ΔLeverage i,t + β 5 ΔNOL_DUM i,t + β 6 ΔChangeNOL i,t + β 7 ΔForeignIncome i,t + β 8 ΔPPE i,t + β 9 ΔIntangibleAssets i,t + β 10 ΔEquityIncome i,t + β 11 ΔSize i,t-1 + β 12 ΔMarket/Book i,t-1 + e i,t
Each of the variables in equation (2) is defined as yearly changes of the variables as defined above in equation (1). A significant coefficient on ΔLTInstOwn i,t or a significant coefficient on ΔSTInstOwn i,t from equation (2) indicates that a yearly change in either long-term institutional ownership or short-term institutional ownership affects the yearly change in firm tax aggressiveness.
17 The Hausman (1978) test rejects exogenity of institutional ownership with respect to our list of instruments used in equation (2) (described in this section) at the 0.01 level.
(2)
Two Stage Least Squared Regression
Our second test that addresses endogeneity concerns uses a two-stage least squares estimation. Following the approach outlined by Gompers and Metrick (2001) LnTurnover i,t = Natural logarithm of prior month volume divided by prior month shares outstanding as reported by CRSP LnVolatility i,t = Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of monthly returns over the previous two years SP500 i,t = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was in the S&P 500 in the previous Year Momentum i,t-3 to t-0 = The firm's past three-month gross return Momentum i,t-12 to t-3 = The 9 month gross return prior to the beginning in the 1 st quarter of the current year and ending with the 2 nd quarter of the prior year
LTInstOwnHat = Predicted value of long-term institutional ownership based on equation (3a)
STInstOwnHat = Predicted value of short-term institutional ownership based on Equation (3b)
All other variables are as defined before.
The instruments for institutional ownership variables in (3a) and (3b) In terms of our hypotheses, the coefficients on STInstOwnHat and LTInstOwnHat in equation (3c) are of interest. Table 2 contains the summary statistics for selected variables used in our regression models. The mean (median) for the five-year cash effective tax rate is 28.0% (27.7%). These averages are consistent with the distributional characteristics for long-run (5-year) Cash ETR's reported in Dyreng et al. (2008) . Average firm in our sample reports more financial accounting income as compared to taxable income, resulting in positive levels of permanent book-tax differences. The mean (median) value of long-term institutional ownership percentage was 18.9 (16.5), while the mean (median) value of short-term institutional ownership percentage was 41.7 (39.7). These values are consistent with the average level of long-term and short-term institutional ownership of samples used in prior research. The median firm in our sample is profitable (with an ROE of 18.9 percent) and moderately leveraged with a long-term debt to asset ratio of 0.135. Approximately 28 percent of firms in our sample have tax NOLs from prior periods. The median value of foreign income for our sample firms is zero dollars, while the 75 th percentile value for foreign income is positive, suggesting that less than fifty percent of our sample firms have income from foreign operations. The average firm in our sample has about 23.7 percent of its assets in property plant and equipment and about 8.6 percent of its total assets are intangible assets. The average firm in our sample has a market value of equity of about $413 million and has a market-to-book ratio of 2.2. Table 3 presents Pearson correlations among the variables used in our regression model.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Correlations
The five-year cash effective tax rate variable is negatively correlated with our measure of permanent book-tax differences. Moreover, both long-term and short-term institutional ownership is negatively correlated with the 5-year cash effective tax rate and positively correlated with permanent book-tax differences. In a univariate sense, these correlations suggest that as institutional ownership increases, firms become more tax aggressive. It is important to note that these correlations do not consider the joint effects of other control variables that can also affect tax aggressiveness. In fact, there is a high correlation between the tax aggressiveness measures and other firm characteristics that have been shown in prior research to affect tax aggressiveness. Moreover, the correlation among the control variables used in equation (1) range from -0.218 to 0.536, suggesting that multicollinearity is not likely to be problematic in multivariate tests. Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (1) in which measures of tax aggressiveness is the dependent variable and short-term institutional ownership, long-term institutional ownership and other control variables are the independent variables. When the firm's five-year cash effective tax rate (5-Year CETR) is the dependent variable, the coefficient on short-term institutional ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that firms with higher levels of short-term institutional ownership are generally more tax aggressive. In contrast when the five-year cash effective tax rate is the dependent variable, the coefficient on long-term institutional ownership is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that firms with higher levels of long-term institutional ownership tend to be less tax aggressive. When permanent book-tax difference (PERM_BTD) is the dependent variable, the coefficient on short-term institutional ownership is positive and statistically significant while the coefficient on long-term institutional ownership is negative and statistically significant while the coefficient.
OLS Regression -Levels
The results from Table 4 support our two hypotheses. Firms with higher levels of shortterm institutional ownership generally display relatively more tax aggressiveness by reporting relatively lower 5-year cash effective tax rates and relatively larger yearly permanent book-tax differences. In contrast, firms with higher levels of long-term institutional ownership are generally less tax aggressive and report higher five-year cash effective tax rate and lower permanent book-tax differences.
-OLS Regression -Levels -Control Variables
The signs on the coefficients of several control variables identified in prior research to affect tax aggressiveness are not only in the predicted direction but also statistically significant.
For example, the coefficients on ROE in both columns are positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that more profitable firms generally have higher long-run cash effective tax rates and larger permanent book-tax differences. In contrast, the coefficients on Leverage in Table 4 are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that as the firm's long-term debt-to-asset ratio increases, our sample firms experience smaller five-year cash effective tax rates, and lower permanent book-tax differences. Consistent with prior literature, this result suggests that debt tax shields are substitutes for tax aggressiveness through increased book-tax differences (Chen et al. 2009 ). The statistically significant coefficients on NOL_Dum and ChangeNOL suggest that firms with NOL carryovers for tax purposes generally have lower long-run cash effective tax rates and fewer permanent differences between book income and taxable income. In addition firms with increases in net operating losses for tax purposes tend to be less tax aggressive by reporting fewer permanent book-tax differences. The statistically significant coefficient on Foreign Income suggest that firms with larger earnings from foreign sources exhibit increased tax aggressiveness through a relatively larger permanent book-tax differences.
Moreover, capital intensive firms, proxied by a higher ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets, have a lower five-year cash effective tax rate and higher permanent book tax differences. In contrast, firms with higher levels of intangible assets scaled by total assets generally report lower permanent book-tax differences. The coefficients on SIZE suggests that larger firms are generally more tax aggressive by reporting relatively lower five-year cash effective tax rates, and reporting higher book-tax differences. Firms with proportionately greater equity income from non-consolidated subsidiaries generally have larger permanent book-tax differences. Moreover, high growth firms, proxied by market-to -book ratio, generally have lower long-run cash effective tax rates and have fewer permanent book-tax differences.
Economic Significance
When the five-year cash effective tax rate is the dependent variable the coefficient on the on the variable STInstOwn is -0.064 while the coefficient on the variable LTInstOwn is 0.098.
These results indicate that an increase in short-term institutional ownership from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile is associated with a decrease in the five-year cash effective tax rate from 26.50% to 24.20%. Furthermore, these results suggest that an increase in long-term institutional ownership from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile is associated with an increase of the five-year cash effective tax rate from 22.61% to 26.23%. Given the average values of the five-year cash effective tax rate for our sample, these effects are large.
When permanent book-tax differences is the dependent variable the coefficient on on the variable STInstOwn is 0.005 while the coefficient on the variable LTInstOwn variable is -0.020.
These results indicate that an increase in short-term institutional ownership from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile is associated with a 6.63% increase in the firm's yearly permanent book-tax differences scaled by beginning assets. In contrast, an increase in long-term institutional ownership from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile is associated with a 9.23% decrease in the firm's yearly permanent book-tax differences scaled by beginning assets. Based on the average values of permanent book-tax differences for our sample, these effects are economically significant.
Change Analysis
Our first set of results presents evidence on the relation of the level of tax aggressiveness with the level of short-term and long-term institutional ownership. However, levels of institutional ownership for a particular firm may change little from one year to the next. As a sensitivity test, we estimate equation (2) which regresses changes in our tax aggressiveness proxies on changes in short-term institutional ownership, changes in long-term institutional ownership, and changes in our other control variables. Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (2) using our two measures of tax aggressiveness. When a change in 5-year cash effective tax rate is the dependent variable, the coefficients on change in short-term and change in long-term institutional ownership variables are not statistically significant at the 0.10 level. This is not surprising because there is a mismatch in the way the change in our test and dependent variables are computed. Note that the change in the five-year cash effective tax rate is calculated over a five-year period where as the change in our test variable is computed over two consecutive years.
In contrast, when changes in permanent book-tax differences is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient on changes in short-term institutional ownership is positive and significant at the 0.01 level while the coefficient on changes in long-term institutional ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These results suggest that when shortterm institutional ownership increases from the prior year, permanent book-tax differences in the current year increase. In addition, when long-term institutional ownership increases from the prior year, permanent book-tax differences in the current year decline. Overall, the evidence from the change models complements the level specification, highlighting the importance of institutional ownership in affecting tax aggressive behavior. The dependent variables in the second stage estimations reported in Table 6 are the two measures of tax aggressiveness: 5-Year CETR and PERM_BTD. The adjusted-R 2 values of the models range from 0.075 to 0.214. Moreover, except for a few variables such as SIZE and Equity Income, the signs on the coefficients of several control variables identified in prior research to affect tax aggressiveness are not only in the predicted direction but also statistically significant.
Two-Stage Least Squares Regression
In terms of our hypotheses, the coefficients on STInstOwnHat and LTInstOwnHat are of interest. When the firm's five-year cash effective tax rate is the dependent variable, the coefficient on STInstOwnHat is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level while the coefficient on LTInstOwnHat is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This result indicates that firms with higher levels of short-term institutional ownership tend to be more tax aggressive while firms with higher levels of long-term institutional ownership tend to be less tax aggressive.
When a permanent book-tax difference (PERM_BTD) is the dependent variable, the coefficient on STInstOwnHat is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level while the coefficient on LTInstOwnHat is insignificant. These results suggest that firms with higher levels of estimated short-term institutional ownership display relatively more tax aggressiveness by reporting relatively larger yearly permanent book-tax differences. The results from Table 6 generally support our hypotheses.
OLS Regression -Levels -High Cash vs. Low Cash Firms
In this section we examine whether the effect of the investment horizons of institutions on tax aggressiveness varies across firms with different levels of cash holdings. Desai and Dharampala (2006) argue that tax avoidance activities can result in more expropriation of investors' wealth by self-serving managers who can easily divert firm resources without detection. This is particularly problematic for cash holdings because it is a fungible asset.
Myers and Rajan (1998) note that managers acting contrary to shareholders' interests can divert cash. Harford et al. (2007) find that internal cash holdings are quickly dissipated in firms with weak governance structures in place. Thus, institutions with long-term horizon may have greater incentive to constrain tax aggressiveness in firms that hold more cash. In contrast, institutions with a short-term horizon may encourage more tax aggressiveness in firms that hold more cash.
To test these cross-sectional predictions, we first classify our sample firms into high-and low-cash subsamples based on median value of the cash to total assets in a year. 18 We then reestimate equation (1) for these two subsamples. Table 7 presents the regression results for the two subsamples using the five year cash effective rate (5-year CETR) and permanent book tax difference (PERM_BTD) as the dependent variables. When 5-year CETR is the dependent variable, the coefficient on STInstOwn for the subsample with high cash is more negative than that of the subsample with low cash, however the difference in the coefficient estimates is not statistically significant. Again, when PERM_BTD is used as a dependent variable, the coefficient on STInstOwn for the subsample with high cash is greater than that of the subsample with low cash, and the difference in the coefficient estimates is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In other words, short-term institutions appear to encourage more tax aggressiveness in the form of permanent book-tax differences in firms with higher cash. In evaluating each firm's long-term institutional ownership percentages, we find firms with more long-term investors display less tax aggressiveness (only based on PERM_BTD) when the level of cash is high than when the level of cash is low. Taken together, these results provide some evidence that the investment horizon of institutions ownership affects tax aggressiveness differently depending on the level of cash held by our sample firms.
OLS Regression -Institutional Shareholder Investment Horizon and Fiduciary Constraints
Prior research on institutional shareholders also suggests that certain types of institutional shareholders, specifically Banks and Pension Funds are subject to strict prudent investor rules (Del Guercio 1996) which may lead to more conservative investment policies.
Bushee (2001) also finds that institutional shareholders subject to the most stringent fiduciary standards, such as Banks also display alternative investment strategies as opposed to other types of institutional shareholders. Therefore, as a sensitivity test we estimate equation (1) results of the regression are in Table 8 . The control variables in Table 8 generally have a similar sign and level of significance as the control variables in Table 4 ; therefore, they are not discussed.
We find that short-term institutional shareholders with low fiduciary standards (mutual funds, brokers and insurance companies) typically influence firms to be tax aggressive by reporting relatively lower 5-year cash effective tax rates and relatively higher permanent booktax differences. In contrast, short-term institutional shareholders with high fiduciary standards (banks and pension funds) generally influence firms to be less tax aggressive.
When the firm's five year cash effective tax rate is the dependent variable, the coefficient on long-term institutional ownership with high fiduciary institutional shareholders (banks and pension funds) and the coefficient on long-term institutional shareholders with low fiduciary shareholders (mutual funds, brokers and insurance companies) are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Furthermore, when a permanent book-tax difference is the dependent variable, the coefficients on long-term institutions with high and low fiduciary shareholders are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Collectively these results suggest long-term institutional shareholders influence underlying firms to be less tax aggressive regardless of the institutional shareholder fiduciary responsibilities.
Using Alternative Operationalization of Investment Horizon
As noted previously, our institutional ownership variable can be sticky. Also, there is a potential for misclassifying institutional ownership into short-term and long-term categories.
Therefore, as a sensitivity test, we calculate each firm's ownership by institutional shareholders that were classified as short-term or long-term in the current year as well as the prior year. This standards average 8.30% ownership of a firm's outstanding stock, while Long-Term Institutional shareholders with High fiduciary requirements average 9.34% ownership of a firm's outstanding stock.
leads to four different ownership classifications: short-term current year and short-term prior year, short-term current year -long-term prior year, long-term current year -short-term prior year, and long-term current year -long-term prior year. Untabulated results indicate that approximately 45% of the institutional owners in our sample were classified as short-term in the current and prior year and approximately 44% of the institutional owners in our sample were classified as long-term in the current and prior year. Thus, only 11% of the institutional owners in our sample that were classified as either short or long-term in previous year switch in their classification to long or short in the current year. To assess the effects of the misclassification on our results, we re-estimate equation (1) using four different ownership classifications.
Regression results using this classification are reported in Table 9 . Our results strongly support our hypotheses. Higher investment by institutional shareholders classified as short-term institutional investors in the current year and the prior year lead to higher levels of tax aggressiveness in the form of lower long-run cash effective tax rates and higher levels of permanent book-tax differences. In contrast, higher levels of investment by long-term institutional shareholders in the current year and the prior year lead to lower levels of tax aggressiveness.
Conclusion
This paper examines the role of institutional investors in corporate governance within the context of the effect of shareholders' horizon on tax aggressiveness. Accounting for the endogeneity problem of institutional ownership and using two measures for tax aggressiveness, we find more tax aggressiveness for firms held by short-term investors and less tax aggressiveness by firms held by long-term investors. Moreover, the effects of institutional ownership on tax aggressiveness are generally more pronounced for firms with higher levels of cash. These relations hold after the inclusion of various controls identified in prior research to affect our tax aggressiveness measures.
The existing literature suggests that investment horizons of institutions can affect the degree to which firm managers are monitored (Schleifer and Vishny 1997; Chen et al. 2007 ).
This study contributes to the literature by highlighting how tax aggressiveness can be driven by a conflict among shareholders with different investment horizons. While shareholders with shortterm investment horizon may choose to incentivize management for more tax aggressiveness, shareholders with a long-term horizon may engage in more monitoring to constrain managers' tax aggressiveness.
This study also sheds light on the question of how to deter tax aggressiveness when a broader corporate culture facilitates aggressive decision making (Frank et al. 2007 ). Institutions with a long-term investment horizon can act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating tax aggressiveness. They have strong incentives to engage in monitoring and in influencing firm mangers in avoiding tax aggressiveness. Overall, our results suggest that the role of the investment horizon of institutions in corporate governance is potentially significant. 
